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LTHOUGH most projections of the pace of
economic activity this year are quite optimistic, un-
certainty continues to cloud the 1972 economic hori-
zon. With unemployment still high by historical
standards, many people remain concerned about their
ability either to obtain a job to their liking or to retain
their present one. Inflation and potential inflationary
pressures are not yet subdued. The effectiveness of
the price and wage control program is still debated by
those who regard it as a necessary, long-term supple-
ment to orthodox monetary-fiscal policies, and by those
who see the program as a disturbing encroachment on
individual freedom. Nineteen seventy-two could also
be a year marking the most sweeping changes in the
international monetary payments mechanism since the
1944 Bretton Woods Conference. Finally, all these
economic developments take on added significance in
light of the coming presidential election.
Many of these issues evolved over a long period
and will he difficult to resolve in a single year. To
assess the course of economic activity over the next
several months, this article discusses first the principal
influences on the course of economic activity and
secondly, the economic outlook.
Factors Influencing The Economic Outlook
The chief factors to be considered in projecting the
economic outlook for 1972 are given in Figure I. The
three major categories are cyclical forces, structural
changes and policy actions.
At any time, the economy has a certain “momentum”
of its own. The direction and magnitude of the mo-
mentum reflect the particular stage of the business
cycle. The momentum of cyclical forces can be offset
or augmented by structural changes or stabilization
policy actions,
Structural changes include developments in the
world trade picture which influence the U.S. balance-
of-payments position, random events such as wars,
strikes and weather shifts, as well as “other” factors.
These other factors include: (1) changes in prefer-
ence, such as an increased preference for saving rela-
tive to consumption, or liquidity relative to goods and
services; (2) changes in the nature or rate of in-
crease of technological advance; (3) changes in the
quantity and quality of available resources, such as a
shift to\vard more availability of inexperienced labor
resources relative to experienced labor resources; and
(4) changes in the institutional and legal framework,
such as the initiation of legally authorized price and
wage controls in a peace-time economy.
Policy actions are the orthodox measures employed
by stabilization authorities to guide the course of eco-
nomic activity. Monetary and fiscal actions taken prior
to and during 1972 will have a substantial bearing on
economic developments during the current year.
Cyclical Influences
Nineteen seventy-t\vo begins the second year of re-
covery from the moderate recession which ended in
November 1970. Much has been macic of the fact that
the first year of the current recovery period was not
as strong as the first year of previous recoveries, hut
insufficient attention has been given to the relation
between the moderate recession and the moderate
recovery. To the extent that forces are set in motion
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which influence the scope of business cycles independ-
ent of policy actions or other outside forces, a strong
recovery in 1971 should not have been anticipated.1
Indeed. many observers accurately predicted a mod-
erate recovery in 1971 based, in some degree, on such
reasoning.
‘Wesley C. Mitchell, a pioneer in business cycle analysis,
wrote on the automatic forces influencing the up and down
phases of the cycle
The various processes just described combine reduc-
tions in both prime costs aud fixed charges with au ex-
pansion in the physical volume of business. In this fashion
depression ultimately brings about revival. For of course
these changes increase prospective profits, and in the
money economy prospective profits are the great incentive
to activity.
In fine, this business situation is that described in the
first section of Chapter 1 — the situation out of which a
revival of activity presently develops. Having thus come
round again to its point of departure, after tracing the
processes of cumulative change by which prosperity breeds
crisis, crisis evolves into depression, and depression paves
the way for a return of prosperity, the present theory of
business cycles has reached its appointed end. i Wesley
Clair Mitchell, Business Cycles and Tlseir Causes (Berke-
ley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1950), pp. 146-47.1 This vohune is a reprint of Part III
of Mitchell’s Business Cycles, originally published in 1913
by the University of California Press.
‘l’hcre is some likelihood that, other things equal, the
more severe is the downturn due to such factors as described
by Mitchell, the stronger will be the upturn. For example, if
the downturn is of sufficient scope that even very efficient
resources become nnemployed, the efficient resources can be
utilized to producea strong upturn after the crisis point is
passed. Outside forces, however, such as strikes and policy
actions, can effectively alter this relation,
Nevertheless, the weakness of the recovery last year
has contributed to the view that there has been a
change in the way the economy works, that the
economic principles xvhich held in times past no longer
apply. There is no question that the economy is con-
stantly changing and the policies used to influence
the course of its movement must be reasonably flexi-
ble. However, a simple comparison of the moderate
recovery in 1971 with vigorous first year recoveries in
the past may overstate the degree of structural
change, especially with regard to production and
employment.
Table I presents changes in several important eco-
nomic variables for each business downssving, for each
recovery and for each entire recession-early recovery
period of the past two decades (see also the ac-
companying chart). The “Total Period” data reflect
both the depth of the recession and the strength of
the early portion of the enstung recovery. On this
basis, the recent economic experience does not appear
as strikingly different from other periods as a com-
parison of recessions alone or early recovery periods
alone would suggest.2
2
Most recessions, areS often termed “inventory” recessions since
sunch of the adjustment in total spending is reflected in the
rate of inventory accumulation. The 1969—70 recession differed
in the respect that inventories did not fall as they did in
previous recessions. Accordingly, it should not have been
expected that inventories would have increased significantly
in the early recovery, and they did not. The change in real
(price-deflated) inventories averaged $2.3 billion in the
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Production and Employment - Industrial production
rose about 20 percent in the first year following the
1957-58 recession, compared with a 3.4 percent in-
crease in the year following the 1969-70 recession.
I-Iosvever, industrial production fell at a 14.5 percent
annual rate during the 1957-58 recession, compared
with a 6.3 percent decline in the 1969-70 recession.
Table I indicates that there has been a strong relation
between the severity of a recession and the strength
of the immediate recovery. In general, the most severe
recession of the four compared was that which oc-
curred in 1957-58, and the strongest immediate re-
covery followed the 1957-58 recession, The mildest
recession was the most recent one (1969-70), and the
mildest recovery was in the 1970-71 period.
1969-70 recession, compared with an average decline for the
three previous recessions of $2.9 billion. The change in real
inventories averaged $2 billion in the 1970-71 recovery, com-
pared with a $3.8 billion average for the three previous
recoveries.
Sonic analysts have suggested the current “low” inven-
tory/sales ratio indicates large increases in inventories in the
near future. The inventory/sales ratio is currently “low” Only
in relation to the past foisr years. It is not far frnsn the
average in relation to past early recovery periods. The
average of the inventory/sales ratio in the early recovery
period (through November 1971) following the 1969-70
recession was 1.56 compared with 1.54, 1.56 and 1.50 for
the recoveries immediately following the recessions of 1960—61,
1957-58 and 1953-54, respectively.
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Growth in real product or industrial production has
not been as strong in the 1969-71 recession-recovery
period as in earlier comparable periods, but differ-
ences (particularly with the 1957-59 period) are not
as great as one might expect. Although industrialpro-
duction has not yet reached its 1969 peak, real product
gains over the latest recession-recovery period are only
slightly less than in the earlier comparable periods.
Payroll employment changes over the several pe-
riods are quite comparable. Payroll employment rose
at a 0.1 percent annual rate in the 1969-71 period.
compared xvith a 0.1 percent rate rise in the 1960-61
period, a 0.7 percent rate rise in the 1953-55 period.
and a 0.4 percent rate decline in the 1957-59 period.
Prices —One of the most substantial differences
among the indicators and periods given in Table I
is the movement of prices in the most recent period.
The implicit GNP deflator rose in the 1969-71 period
at a 4.5 percent annual rate, more than txvice as
rapid as in any earlier comparable recession-recovery
period. On its face, such a difference would appear
to reflect substantial structural changes in the economy.
An alternative, or supplementary, explanation for
the difficulty in restraining price advances in the most
recent recession-recovery period is framed in terms of
price anticipations. The longer that prices are per-
mitted to rise unchecked, the more expectations of
rising prices are incorporated into current prices
through higher wages, rents, and other contractural
obligations. Anticipations of higher prices built up
over a period of years can effectively impede the
efforts of stabilization authorities to halt inflationwith-
out any significant changes in economic structure (for
example, more monopoly power on the part of unions
or businesses) having occurred.
Prices rose for 35 quarters from the trough of the
1961 recession to the peak of the recovery ending in
1969. The next longest period from trough to peak
(in the past two decades) in which prices were per-
mitted to rise was the 15 quarter period preceding
the 1953-54 recession. Given the length of the period
over which prices rose and the fact that price in-
creases accelerated in each succeeding year after 1962
(especially in the latter half of the 1960s), it should
not have been surprising that the moderate stabiliza-
tion measures adopted in 1969 to stem inflation were
not immediately successful in reversing the trend.a
iThe model of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, pub-
lished in the .April 1970 issue of this Review, indicated at
that time that follov.’ing a course of 6 percent money growth
(and high-employment expenditures as estimated by this
Bank) from the fourth quarter of 1969 to the fourth quarter
Structural Influences
There are sufficient differences in the economic
indicators over the recession-recovery periods to sug-
gest that cyclical influences alone cannot explain the
variations. The structural changes which have oc-
curred over the years have affected, in particular, the
short-run unemployment-prices relation.
The unemployment rate rise from 3.6 percent at the
beginning of the recession to 6 percent at the end of
the early recovery over the latest recession-recovery
period is the most severe of the past four such periods,
despite the fact that payroll employment increased
more rapidly in the most recent period than in 1957-59,
as rapidly as in 1960-61, and only slightly less rapidly
than in l953~55.1Part of the explanation for this ap-
parent paradox is that (1) the labor force has been
increasing more rapidly in the past recession-recovery
period than in most earlier ones, and (2) the compo-
sition of the labor force has been shifting such that
proportionately more of the labor force is composed
of individuals with a historically high average rate of
unemployment. Women and teen-agers, for example,
comprise relatively more of the labor force than in
earlier recession-recovery periods.
The change in the composition of the labor force
over the past decade represents a structural shift in
the economy. It is a shift which has worsened the
tenuous, short-tenn relation between unemployment
and prices through the aggravation of unemployment.
of 1971 would find prices still rising at a rapid rate at the
end of 1971.
By late 1971, total spending would be increasing
at an eight percent rate with such monetary actions
[6 percent annual rate of increase of money]. The
mate of price increase would fall somewhat, however,
because of past restrictive monetary actions. But the
gain in price perfonnance would be small, because
liy late 1971 prices would still be increasing at a four
percent rate [Lennall C. Andersen and Keith M. Carl-
son, “A Monetarist Model for Economic Stabilization,”
this Review (April 1970), p.20].
A simulation of the model over the IV/1969-II/1971 period
(before price and wage controls) with actual money and
high-employment expenditures and coefficients estimated
through IV/1969, projected a 4.9 percent six-quarter average
price increase, compared with an actual average of 5.4 per-
cent. See Keith M. Carlson, “Projecting With the St. Louis
Model: A Progress Report,’ this issrse of the Review, pp.





e rise in the unemployment rate from 3.6 percent in
IV/1969 to 6 percent in IV/1971 reflects the persistence of
relatively high levels of unemployment during the recent re-
covery. Unemployment rose from 2.7 percent of the labor
force in 111/1953 to 4.1 percent in 111/1955, an increase of
1.4 percentage points. Unemployment increased 1.6 percent-
age points from 4.2 percent to 5.8 percent in the 1957-59
period and one percentage point frmn 5.2 to 6.2 percent in
the 1960-61 recession-recovery period.
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Another structural change which may have affected
unemployment is the fact that U.S. exports relative
to imports have been slowing in recent years. Net
U.S. exports slowed each year (except 1970) from
$8.5 billion in 1964 to $0.7 billion in 1971. Employ-
ment and output in a number of U.S. industries are
probably less than they would be otherwise if it were
not for the deterioration of the U.S. competitive posi-
tion over the past several years. Over a long period,
U.S. resources may shift from industries with declining
export demand to other industries, hut during the
period of adjustment,’ employment is probably af-
fected adversely.
Quite likely, structural changes have also hampered
efforts to slowprice increases. The shifting composition
of final output from the production of goods to the
production of services has probably tended to rein-
force price pressures. Because of the nature of many
services rendered, such as those of barbers, lawyers,
and government workers, productivity gains are dif-
ficult to achieve (or measure). The production of
goods such as automobiles or appliances can be more
easily enhanced by technological advances and/or
mass assemblage techniques. Lower productivity, other
things equal, results in lower potential output, a more
severe total supply constraint relative to total de-
mand, and consequently, higher prices.’
The minimum wage, which puts a floor under wage
rates, and also tends to increase unemployment by
making inexperienced workers ineligible for many
jobs, has been extended to cover more workers in re-
cent years than in the 1950s. Although the minimum
wage was designed to benefit the worker, it is possible
5
See Roger %V. Spencer, “Population, The Labor Force, and
Potential Output: Implications for the St. Louis Model,” this
Review (February 1971), pp. 15-23.
Because structural changes probably have accounted
for some worsening of the prices-unemployment rela-
tion, structural measures could play a strong role in
improving the relation. Job training, information and
relocation subsidies, and the elimination of legal and
institutional barriers to jobs (such as the minimum
wage) could bolster orthodox monetary and fiscal
stabilization techniques to achieve the goals of a low
rate of unemployment and price stability.
Stabilization Policy Actions
The impact of monetary and fiscal policy actions
on economic activity is, like cyclical and structural
influences, not easy to identify or measure. A rough
approximation of aggregate monetary and fiscal policy
actions prior to and during recent recession-recovery
periods is given in Table II. Such actions nonnally
influence economic activity with some lag, and a
period of three quarters before each peak was arbi-
frarily selected as the point from which actions affect-
ing activity over the course of the recession-early
recovery periods should be dated.6 Money, defined to
include demand deposits and currency in the hands
of the public, is used to represent monetary policy
actions and high-employment expenditures is selected
as the fiscal policy variable. Both are deflated by the
implicit price deflator to account for varying price
trends over the past twenty years.7
15
See Andersen and Carlson, “A Monetarist Model, for some
evidence on the relevant length of policy action lags.
T
Another method of adjusting stabilization policy actions for
changes in trend over a long period is given in Leonall C.
Andersen, “A Monetarist View of Demand Management: The
United States Experience,” this Review (September 1971),
p. 9. Andersen adjusts the money supply by enmparing its
growth relative to various trends over the 1952-71 period.
that it has affected adversely both unemployment and
prices. This structural shift is one endorsed by law.
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Rapid growth of the money stock, relatis e to prices
is presumed to have a short-run stimulative effect on
the economy, as is rapid growth of high-employment
expenditures relative to prices. For example, there
would probably he general agreement that monetary
actions were stimulative in the IV/1967-I\T/1968 pe-
riod when money/prices rose 3.2percent and restrictive
in the IV/1968-IV/1969 period when money/prices
declined 1.3 percent.8
Table II suggests that monetary actions were rela-
tively stimulative in the 1952-55 period, but fiscal ac-
tions were not (unwinding of the Korean War). Fiscal
actions were relatively stimulative in the 1956-59 and
1959-61 periods (compared to the 1952-55 and 1969-
71 periods), but monetary actions were not. Neither
monetary nor fiscal actions were overly expansive in
the 1969-71 period.
By these crude indexes, the slightly stimulative
monetary actions in 1969-71 relative to 1956-59 or
1959-61, would tend to exert more inflationary pres-
sure than in the two earlier periods, and also tend to
maintain the unemployment rate at a relatively lower
level than in the two earlier periods. This most recent
monetary trend may represent a partial explanation
for the lack of success in slowing price rises in recent
years relative to the two earlier periods, and for the
success attained in holding the aggregate unemploy-
ment rate lower than in the t\vo earlier periods (the
unemployment rate reached a peak of 6 percent in
the latest recession-recovery period, compared with
7.4 percent and 7 percent for the 1957-59 and 1960-61
periods, respectively).
Two other factors — the shifts in composition of the
labor force mentioned above and the sizable defense
cutbacks in recent years (reflected in the 2.3 percent
figure for expenditures/prices in the table) — have
contributed to the high unemployment rates for in-
Sfl should he noted that monetary and fiscal authorities can-
not control money/prices and expenditures/prices over any
brief period; they may, however, control money and
expenditures.
experienced workers across the country and defense-
oriented xvorkers in particular geographic areas of the
United States.°
The Economic Outlook
The current economic outlook is based on recent
and projected cyclical, structural and policy influ-
ences. These factors affect economic activity in 1972
and beyond.
Current Cyclical and Structural
Considerations
The U.S. economy begins the year 1972 at a
position on the business cycle not substantially dif-
ferent from that a year ago in terms of actual “mo-
mentum” relative to potential. Although real product
rose at a 6.1 percent rate from the third to the fourth
quarter of 1971, after increasing at a 3 percent rate
from the first to the third quarter, output advances
have not been sufficient to reduce unemployment.
The rate of utilization of both labor and capital re-
sources has changed little in the past year. Actual
output is approximately 93 percent of potential out-
put, about the same as a year ago. Thus the “mo-
mnentum” of the economy moving into 1972 gives little
reason by itself to alter economic projections from the
actual developments of 1971.
°“Thetotal employment attributable to military expenditures,
including military forces and government civilian personnel,
dropped from a peak of 7.8 million in 1968 to about 6.1
mnillinn in 1971, a loss of 1.7 million jobs over the three—year
period, with more than 900,000 of these lost during 1970-71.”
Richard P. Oliver, “Employment Effects of Reduced Dc-
tensed Spending,” Monthly Labor Review (December 1971),
p. 4.
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Most structural changes occur slowly over tinne, but
there are sonic important developments changing the
1972 outlook from that of 1971. Little is currently
known as to whether preferences for liquidity and
saving relative to the purchase of goods and services
have changed much from last year, but it is unlikely
that the long-term trend of preference toward services
from goods will be much altered, Moreover, there is
little basis on which to project changes in economic
activity in 1972 over 1971 because of differing re-
source trends, weather changes, war developments,
technological advancements, or strike patterns.
There are at least two structural changes which
will likely exert some influence on the economy in
1972. First, the anticipated improvement in demnand
for U.S. exports relative to imports should have an
expansionary effect on total spending, output, and
employment.10 Second,price and wage controls should
contribute to a slowing in the rate of increase of
prices in 1972, given moderate stabilization actions.
Price increases leveled off in 1970 and 1971, and
may have been decelerating slightly when the Presi-
dent called for a wage-price freeze last August 15.
Since the imposition of the freeze and the second
phase of the Administration’s program, measured
prices have slowed. \Vholesale prices of industrial
commodities increased at a 0.5 percent rate from
August to December, after rising at a 4.6 percent rate
in the preceding eight months. Consumer price in-
creases sloxved to a 2.5 percent rate from August to
December, compared with a 3.8 percent rate from
December 1970 to August.
Problems of administration and equity will likely
intensify the longer the program remains in existence,
hut in the latter months of 1971, at least, \vage and
price controls seemed to have had the desired effect.
The potential for eventual success of the program is
enhanced by: (1) the fact that the controls have not
been accompanied by excessive monetary stimulus;
2) the fact that there is currently substantial eco-
nomic slack; (3) the possibility that controls may
have helped stem anticipations of higher prices; and
mO”The expected employment gains for the United States will
probably be spread over about two years, too, according to
Peter C. Peterson, the White ‘louse International Economic
Policy Chief. Each $1 billion of payments turnabout will
create 60,000 to 80,000 jobs, he estimates. Thus, attainin
the Connally goal of a8 9billion swing for the better conl
mean more than 700,000 additional jobs by late 1973; that
in itself would be enough to lower the unemployment rate
to about 5.2 percent from November’s 6 percent,” Richard
F. Janssen, “The New Dollar: Devaluation of 8.57 Percent
Likely to Create Jobs, help Nixon Summitry,” The Wall
Street Journal, December 20, 1971, p. 25. These export-
related employment gains anticipated by the administration
seem overly optimistic.
(4) the fact that the wage negotiation calendar for
1972 is relatively light.
Recent Monetary and Fiscal Policy Actions
The course of economic activity in 1972 depends,
in part, on both monetary and fiscal policy actions.
There is a carry-over effect from actions taken last
year, and there will be some effect from actions taken
during 1972.
Monetary Actions — The rate of growth of the
money stock fluctuated more widely in 1971 than
usual. After rising 5.4 percent from December 1969
to December 1970, the money stock accelerated to a
10.3 percent annual rate of growth in the first seven
months of 1971, and then slowed markedly to very
little growth during the last five months of the year
and into January 1972.
These violent swings in money movements were
accompanied by roughly similar changes in interest
rates. The three-month Treasury hill rate, for exam-
ple, rose from a low of 3.3 percent in March 1971 to a
peak of 5.5 percent in July, amid then fell to a little
over 3 percent in January 1972. Falling interest rates
in the latter half of 1971 have been viewed by many
analysts as a spur to economic activity in 1972, and
indeed a lower cost of capital is often one of the ways
by which monetary changes influence spending.
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However, because there are channels other than
interest rates through which monetary growth affects
economic activity, the recent slower growth in the
money stock may have a restrictive effect on spending
(assuming a relatively stable demand for money).
When the money stock expands rapidly relative to de-
mand, its value falls, and people exchange money for
goods and services at a rapid rate. Conversely, when
growth of the money stock slows, relative to demand,
its higher value makes people more reluctant to ex-
change their cash for goods and services. Persistent
and pronounced swings in monetary growth rates
have consistently led similar swings in spending.
Thus, the slower monetary expansion during late
1971 may retard economic activity during the first
part of 1972 from what it would otherwise have been.
Activity later in the year will he influenced by mone-
tary expansion during the early part of 1972.
Fiscal Action.s — Federal expenditures-affect eco-
nomic activity iii two ways. First, Federal Govern—
mnent outlays, whether financed by taxes or borrowed
from the public, have an important short—run stimula-
tive effect omi total spending. Over longer periods of
time, such expenditures tend to displace private pur-
chases of goods and services. Second, increased Fed-
eral Government expenditures, financed in pam-t by
borrowing, often induce expansion in the money stock,
as the Federal Reserve “monetizes” a part of the debt
increase. Tax reductions also tend to expand the size
of the deficit. The larger the deficit, the more likely
is the Federal Reserve to increase its purchases of
Treasury securities, which in turn, increases the
money stock.
The high-employment budget, which assumes
budget expenditures and tax revenues at a constant
4 percent level of unemployment, is expected to shift
markedly from a $4.2 billion surplus (as estimated by
this Bank) in fiscal 1971 to a $10.5 billion deficit in
fiscal 1972. The fiscal 1973 high-employment budget
is expected to run a 810.9 billion deficit. Thus the
budget, by such actions as the 7 percent tax invest-
mnent credit, the increased personal income tax exemp-
tions and accelerated expenditures, should have a
stimulative effect 0mm economic activity this calendar
year.
1972 Projections
Stimulative fiscal actions provide much of the basis
for the very optimistic 1972 forecasts which have ap-
peared regularly in tile media the past few months.
FEBRUARY 1972
The Federal budget deficit in fiscal year 1971 (on a
unified budget basis) was $23 billion, the second
largest deficit recorded since World War II. The
budget deficit for fiscal year 1972, estimated at $11.6
billion in early 1971, has been revised upward to
838.8 billion. Reasons for the revision include an over-
estimate of the strength of the economy in calendar
year 1971, and the Administration’s new fiscal pro-
posals of last August amid this January. Congress has
already acted favorably on a number of the Adminis-
tration’s proposals of August 1971.
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A large majority of economic forecasters have pre-
dicted a strong surge in spending this year. Such
unanimity is difficult to understand in view of the
additional uncertainties with which the analysts are
faced in 1972. The chiefunknown influences on spend-
ing are usually monetary and fiscal actions, but this
year the analysts must also project the expected im-
pact of the possible removal of some trade barriers,
the dollar devaluation, and foreign exchange rate ad-
justments, as well as the effects of price-xvage controls,
their duration, and the successive phases, if any, of
controls. Uncertainty often breeds divergence, but this
year the product of uncertainty is conformity.
The standard projections of economic activity in
1972 include: (1) approximately a $100 billion rise
in total spending compared to a $73 billion increase
in 1971; (2) an increase in real product growth from
2.7 percent in 1971 to about 6 percent; (3) a decline
in the rate of price increase from 4.7 percent in 1971
to a little over 3 percent; and (4) a steady fall in
the unemployment rate from 6 percent to a little over
5 percent by year end.
Most forecasters believe these ebullient figures will
be achieved by way of the following standard route:
the consumer, bolstered by the progress of the wage-
price control program and higher tax exemptions,
starts spending more (and saving less); the increased
expenditures reduce sellers’ inventories, which mnust
then be replenished; a greater sales volume leads to
higher profits which, together with the tax investment
credit, induce capital expenditures; exports accelerate
in response to increased demnand from abroad, thereby
creating many more jobs; residential construction and
state and local spending pick up moderately, while
Federal Government purchases of goods and services
accelerate.
MIT-PENN-SSRC Model — Typical of the mnodels
which generate such projections for 1972 is the MIT-
PENN-SSRG(MPS) econometric model. It is a large
model of the economy with many behavioral relation-
ships and most of the latest features in model build-
ing, such as a well-developed financial sector. In
addition, the model can give detailed projections of
each economic sector in response to any of a large
number of simulated policy actions. It, like most large
models, incorporates cyclical forces, some structural
changes, and possible policy alternatives.
under varying assumptions of both price and wage
constraints; (4) has relatively long lags in the
effect of changes in the money supply on economic
activity and short lags in the effect of fiscal actions
on economic activity; (5) projects estimates of total
spending indirectly by the addition of GNP compon-
ents rather than directly.
Table III indicates that the MPS model, under
the assumptions that the money stock will grow at a
6 percent rate, that price and wage controls will be
effective through 111/1972, and that import prices will
rise relative to the prices of U.S. exports, projects
changes in total spending, real output, and prices in
1972 similar to those of the “standard” forecast.” The
unemployment rate projection is high relative to the
standard.
St. Louis Model — Table III gives the projections
of the St. Louis model for total spending, real output,
prices, and the unemployment rate using the 6 percent
money growth assumption employed with the MPS
model. In this model, monetary and fiscal actions
affect prices and real output (and, in turn, employ-
ment) by influencing the course of total spending.
Monetary actions are the dominant source of changes
in total spending. Whether the spending is channeled
into real output changes or price changes depends on
the degree of slack (actual output relative to poten-
tial ) in the economy audi the intensity of price antici-
pations. The model can aceotmnt for cyclical forces,
hut offers a more limited selection of policy alterna-
tn-es than the large models. Some provision for struc-
tural change is found in the potential output variable.
ilSix percent money supply growth was ambifrarily selected
as the monetary assumption. Other assumptions are similarly
arbitrary.
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Unlike the smnall St. Louis Bank model, the larger,
more detailed MPS model: (1) contains both money
demand and supply functions; (2) can account to
some extent for the expectedl improvement in U.S.
net exports; (3) can simulate changes in activity
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The St. Louis model projects considerably smaller
economic advances in 1972 over the year 1971 than
either the standard or the MPS forecast (based on a
6 percent money gro~vthassumption). Total spending,
according to the St. Louis model, will rise 7.5 percent,
the samne as in 1971, real output will increase 3.5
percent, somewhat more than in 1971, prices will rise
3.9 percent, somewhat less than in 1971, and the
unemployment rate will be little changed from this
past year.
There are three basic reasons why this set of St.
Louis projections differs so much from the standard.
First, the model has incorporated the sharply lo’tver
growth of the money stock in late 1971, the effect of
which does not appear in the MPS or most other
models for a long period. Second, no provision is
made for the actions of the Price Commission and
Pay Board. Third, the model does not account for the
expected increase in foreign demand for U.S. goods.
Because price and wage controls will likely keep
price advances in 1972 below what they otherwise
would be, and because increased demand for exports
will probably stimulate spending, output and employ-
ment, the St. Louis projections for prices and un-
employment should be adjusted downward, and the
projections for total spending and real output up-
ward, given a 6 percent rate of increase in the money
stock. These projections should not be adjusted to the
optimistic levels of the standard forecast, however,
since the standard forecast is not appropriately “ad-
justed” for the influence of the recent slowdown in
the grosvth rate of money.
Looking Past 1972
To this point, only a limited set of figures for a
few economic variables for a single year, 1972, have
been discussed. To focus on such a narrow field is
to miss much of the imnportance of current and future
domestic economic developments. At least one issue
price and wage controls — merits further consideration.
The adoption of price and wage controls by the U.S.
Government in a period of peace time is a move
which has strong long—term implications for our basi-
cally free market economy. Although there have been
some brief periods of success with controls in this
countmy as well as in a number of foreign countries,
instances in which inflation was effectively curbed
over sustained periods are rare indeed. Price and
wage freezes have typically been followed by controls
inequitably applied and ineffectively administered.
The initial euphoria over the fact that someone is
doing something to stop inflation has often given way
to dissatisfaction on the part of those svhose incomes
do not rise as fast as others and to cheating by those
who cannot buy or sell goods at the administered
prices. Once the controls are removed, past experience
indicates prices may rise back to about where they
would have been in the absence of controls,”
The MPS model, using the assumed 6 percent rate
of monetary growth, indicates that prices would rise
about as rapidly in 1973 as in 1972 if controls were
removed toward the end of this year. This model also
indicates that without any controls, hut with moderate
mnommetary growth, there would he less inflation in 1973
than in 1972, a result also given by the St. Louis
model.
Summary
Nineteen seventy-one was a year of moderate re-
covery following the moderate recession in 1970. Com-
parisons with previous recession-early recovery years
indicate that economic expansion in the 1970-71 pe-
riod was slightly weaker than in earlier comparable
periods. A major difference is that prices rose at a
much faster rate during the recent period than in the
earlier ones. Some structural changes in the economy
have undoubtedly occurred over the years, but they
have probably played a minor role in influencing
recent activity relative to normal cyclical adjustments
and policy changes. Excessively stimulative monetary
and fiscal policies over the extended 1965-68 period,
for example, undoubtedly made the recent inflationary
situation much more difficult to control than earlier
ones.
Most projections of economic activity in 1972 are
quite optimistic relative to the actual experience of
1971, What makes 1972 that much different from
1971? The differences may be explored by examining
cyclical influences, structural changes, and policy
actions.
The economny begins 1972 at only a slightly different
position on the business cycle than a year ago in
terms of actual “momentum” relative to potential. The
~ Ulman and Robert Flanagan recently completed a
study nf incomes policies in other countries. “However, as
indicated at the nutsct, periods of apparent effectiveness
[of price-wage controls] ‘vere typically shnrt-lived; the
were frequently fnllowed by wage or price explosions whic
sometimes blew up the policies themselves. Thus the policy
at best seems to have been gaited for a short sprint rather
than a long race, which suggests that it was better suited
to deal with short-run emergencies like balance-of-payments
diseqimilibria than with persistent inflationary forces.” See
Lloyd Ulman and Robert J. Flanagan, Wage Restraint: A
Stud,1
of I,mcm-ne Policies- in Western Europe (Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of Califnmnia Press, 1971) p. 223.
Page IiFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
rate of utilization of both labor and capital resources
is little changed fromn this timelast year. Actual output
relative to potential output is approximately the same
as a year ago. Some structural aspects of the economy
such as the composition of the labor force and the
ratio of goods to services will be little different than
in 1971. Productivity may rise at a more rapid rate
in 1972 than 1971, but short-run changes in productiv-
ity are more a result of cyclical changes than a cause.
There are at least two institutional changes which
will likely exert a strong influence on the economy in
1972. First, the anticipated improvement in demand
for U.S. exports relative to imports due to exchange
rate and tariff changes should have an expansionary
effect on total spending, output and employment.
Second, price and wage controls should contribute to
a slowing in the rate of increase of prices in 1972. If
the controls are effective over the short period of a
year, many analysts believe this will have a positive
influence on consumer confidence and lead to spend-
ing gains. The effect of controls on profits, work stop-
pages and price-wage escalator contracts is unclear.
FEBRUARY 1972
A major difference between 1971 and 1972 is that
fiscal policy actions will likely be much more stimula-
tive. To the extent that the large, projected 1972
deficit is “monetized” by the Federal Reserve System,
monetary policy may also be quite stimulative. Most
economic analysts and models have not, however, ac-
counted for the recent slowing in the rate of growth
of the money stock. Correction for this factor suggests
somewhat lower projections than the norm for spend-
ing, output, and employment in 1972.
Focusing on economic developments in 1972 runs
the risk of overlooking the important long-range im-
plications of recent policy actions. The record of price-
wage controls and sharp fluctuations in the money
stock over a number of years gives little reason for
continuation of such actions over an extended period.
In developing stabilization policies, it should be recog-
nized that an economy the magnitude of ours cannot
be steered in any direction instantaneously, and that
effective policies should look to the long-run effects,
rather than to the short cures which often lead to
long-run instability.
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